. Border: Military Intimidation, Diplomatic Seduction, Border Talks and Incursions, and Siliguri Corridor
Military
intimidation followed by diplomatic seduction has formed an important
part of China’s policy towards Bhutan. After the closing of the border,
trade and all diplomatic contacts in 1960, China resorted to significant
military posturing against Bhutan at least twice – in 1966 and in 1979
along the border which remains the prime reason of dispute. In 1966, on
the tri-junction of Bhutan, Chumbi Valley and Sikkim, the Tibetan
grazers accompanied by Chinese troops entered Doklam pastures. China
later “formally extended claim to about 300 sq. miles of northeastern
Bhutan and also substantial areas north of Punakha, the former capital
of Bhutan.” When Bhutan requested New Delhi to raise this matter with
Beijing, China rejected talking to India saying that the issues
concerned China and Bhutan alone and "the Indian government has no right
whatsoever to intervene in it (Singh 2000: 1109-1127)."
China
followed up this incident by voting in favour of Bhutan’s membership at
the United Nations (UN) in 1971 which implied its recognition of
Bhutan. However, Bhutan’s strong support to India in the UN over
Bangladesh issue the same year irked China dissuading them from building
further momentum (Ibid).
The
coronation of the new King of Bhutan in 1974 where China sent a
high-level delegation and Bhutan’s vote in the UN in 1977 favouring the
Chinese position against India’s on who should represent Cambodia marked
opening up of other vistas of cooperation. For Bhutan, the Janata
government in New Delhi made the task easier as its policy of
“beneficial bilateralism” signaled normalisation of India-China
relations (Gulati 2000: 79). China wanted the border talks to begin but
with Bhutan still unprepared, it ensured large-scale intrusions in 1979.
The negotiations finally began in 1984. In 1998, they agreed on Four
Guiding Principles for further talks which included maintaining peace
along the border, something China often violated to create pressure.
After nineteen rounds of talks by January 2010, the two sides are said
to have nearly finalised boundary demarcation (Bhutan Research 2012) and
almost prepared to establish diplomatic ties with China (Sina.com, 13
April 2012). China also offered a sweet package deal to Bhutan that
Bhutan has been reluctant to conclude. Medha Bisht (2010) wrote about
the complexities involved in such a deal:
The
protracted nature of Sino-Bhutan boundary talks and the continuous
Chinese intrusions into Bhutanese territory reveals the strategic
element embedded in the package deal. In November 2007, Chinese forces
dismantled several unmanned posts near the Chumbi valley. This, analysts
put it, has ‘distorted the Sino-Bhutanese border near Sikkim,’ with
Chinese forces only a few kilometers away from the Siliguri corridor.
Chumbi Valley, a vital tri-junction between Bhutan, India and China
border, is significant as it is 500 km from Siliguri corridor—the
chicken neck which connects India to North East India and Nepal to
Bhutan. Meanwhile Chumbi Valley is of geostrategic importance to China
because of its shared borders with Tibet and Sikkim. The North-Western
areas of Bhutan which China wants in exchange for the Central areas lie
next to the Chumbi Valley tri-junction.