. Border: Military Intimidation, Diplomatic Seduction, Border Talks and Incursions, and Siliguri Corridor

Military intimidation followed by diplomatic seduction has formed an important part of China’s policy towards Bhutan. After the closing of the border, trade and all diplomatic contacts in 1960, China resorted to significant military posturing against Bhutan at least twice – in 1966 and in 1979 along the border which remains the prime reason of dispute. In 1966, on the tri-junction of Bhutan, Chumbi Valley and Sikkim, the Tibetan grazers accompanied by Chinese troops entered Doklam pastures. China later “formally extended claim to about 300 sq. miles of northeastern Bhutan and also substantial areas north of Punakha, the former capital of Bhutan.” When Bhutan requested New Delhi to raise this matter with Beijing, China rejected talking to India saying that the issues concerned China and Bhutan alone and "the Indian government has no right whatsoever to intervene in it (Singh 2000: 1109-1127)."

China followed up this incident by voting in favour of Bhutan’s membership at the United Nations (UN) in 1971 which implied its recognition of Bhutan. However, Bhutan’s strong support to India in the UN over Bangladesh issue the same year irked China dissuading them from building further momentum (Ibid).

The coronation of the new King of Bhutan in 1974 where China sent a high-level delegation and Bhutan’s vote in the UN in 1977 favouring the Chinese position against India’s on who should represent Cambodia marked opening up of other vistas of cooperation. For Bhutan, the Janata government in New Delhi made the task easier as its policy of “beneficial bilateralism” signaled normalisation of India-China relations (Gulati 2000: 79). China wanted the border talks to begin but with Bhutan still unprepared, it ensured large-scale intrusions in 1979. The negotiations finally began in 1984. In 1998, they agreed on Four Guiding Principles for further talks which included maintaining peace along the border, something China often violated to create pressure. After nineteen rounds of talks by January 2010, the two sides are said to have nearly finalised boundary demarcation (Bhutan Research 2012) and almost prepared to establish diplomatic ties with China (Sina.com, 13 April 2012). China also offered a sweet package deal to Bhutan that Bhutan has been reluctant to conclude. Medha Bisht (2010) wrote about the complexities involved in such a deal:

The protracted nature of Sino-Bhutan boundary talks and the continuous Chinese intrusions into Bhutanese territory reveals the strategic element embedded in the package deal. In November 2007, Chinese forces dismantled several unmanned posts near the Chumbi valley. This, analysts put it, has ‘distorted the Sino-Bhutanese border near Sikkim,’ with Chinese forces only a few kilometers away from the Siliguri corridor. Chumbi Valley, a vital tri-junction between Bhutan, India and China border, is significant as it is 500 km from Siliguri corridor—the chicken neck which connects India to North East India and Nepal to Bhutan. Meanwhile Chumbi Valley is of geostrategic importance to China because of its shared borders with Tibet and Sikkim. The North-Western areas of Bhutan which China wants in exchange for the Central areas lie next to the Chumbi Valley tri-junction.